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Does good corporate governance lead to stronger productivity growth?  
Evidence from market-oriented and blockholder-based governance regimes 
Abstract: 
This  study  investigates  the  impact  of  corporate  governance  and  product  market competition on total factor productivity 
growth in Germany and the UK. For Germany, the prototype of a bank-based governance system, productivity grows faster 
in firms controlled by financial institutions (in particular, banks and insurance companies) and intense competition reinforces 
this  beneficial  impact.  Furthermore,  the  importance  of  the  German  creditors  (mostly  banks)  for  productivity  growth  is 
particularly significant in firms which experience financial difficulties or are in financial distress. For the UK, a market-based 
governance system, we do not find any evidence that creditors play a disciplinary role. Still, there is strong evidence that 
shareholder control (by insiders, private outsiders and financial institutions) leads to substantial increases in productivity in 
poorly performing firms. We also find evidence that product market competition is a substitute for blockholder control in the 
UK. 
Introduction 
In  a  recent  survey,  Bartelsman  and  Doms  (2000)  identify  four  factors  that  are  likely  to  influence 
productivity  growth  at  the  micro  level:  (i)  technology  and  human  capital  affecting  efficiency  in 
production; (ii) government regulation altering the incentives for innovating, market entry, and gaining 
market share; (iii) (international) competition on product markets making firms learn faster about new 
technologies; (iv) firm ownership determining the firm’s choices on technology and inputs. Research on 
the impact of this fourth factor, ownership and control, on changes in productivity has been scarce.
1 Not 
just ownership and control is expected to influence factor productivity but, more generally, the corporate 
governance environment of the firm. For the purposes of this study, we interpret corporate governance 
as the amalgam of the firm’s control concentration and structure, and capital structure (including the role 
of  banks  as  major  creditors)  and  their  interactions  with  product  market  competition  and  corporate 
performance.
2 The corporate control definition of La Porta et al. (1997, 2000) is broader as it includes 
those aspects of corporate law and (stock exchange) regulation which have a bearing on disclosure and 
shareholder  and  creditor  protection.  Therefore,  we  investigate  the  relation  between  corporate 
governance  and  product  market  competition,  and  productivity  growth  for  two  different  corporate 
governance regimes: the Anglo-American market-oriented and the continental European blockholder-
based corporate governance systems.  
Empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance and its impact on firm performance has recently 
been accumulating (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey on the US and Denis and McConnell 
(2002)  for  an  international  review).  Most  research  has  focused  on  the  Anglo-American  governance 
                                                 
1 In financial economics, the goal is typically not to explain productivity but some other measure of firm performance. Still, 
productivity growth is a prime sources of value creation. 
2 For theoretical analyses on the role of ownership structure, see Shleifer and Vishny (1986), on the role of capital structure, 
see Jensen (1986), and on the role of competition, see Hart (1983).   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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regime characterised by well-developed capital markets, the prevalence of institutional investors such 
as mutual and pension funds, substantial investor protection, an active market of corporate control, and a 
focus on shareholder value. In the blockholder-based economies of continental Europe, capital markets 
are shallow compared to the UK and the US, ownership is marked by strong control concentration and 
complex pyramidal ownership structures, there is lower investor protection, and the firm’s objective is a 
(legally enshrined) stakeholder approach (Barca and Becht (2001)). This study builds on the institutional 
differences between market-oriented and bank-oriented systems of corporate governance to learn more 
about the efficacy of governance systems. We choose two countries typical for each of these governance 
regimes: for the market-oriented system, we choose the UK and for the blockholder-based system, we 
opt for Germany. It should be noted that the German corporate landscape is not only characterised by 
large  controlling  share blocks, but also by the predominance of large banks. These German ‘house 
banks’ (Hausbanken) are major creditors with long-term lending relationships, and also possess control 
rights through direct and indirect share ownership which often yields supervisory board representation. 
Therefore, Germany is often referred to as a bank-oriented corporate governance system.
3 
Using two large samples of non-financial German and UK firms, we analyse the relation of product 
market competition, governance and productivity growth by applying the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimation  method  to  take  care  of  endogeneity  problems,  which  often  plague  empirical  corporate 
governance studies (Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002), Himmelberg et al. (1999)). We examine whether 
strong  control  concentration  is  beneficial  to  total  factor  productivity  changes.  In  other  words,  we 
investigate whether specific types of controlling shareholders are able to monitor management well such 
that stronger productivity growth can be realised. In this context, we attach particular importance to the 
control part of financial institutions and insiders in the UK, and of corporations and private outsiders in 
Germany. As it may be that the degree of product market competition fulfils an important disciplinary 
role, we explore whether product market competition acts as a substitute to the monitoring task of large 
shareholders.  We  also  examine  whether  creditors  (and  for  Germany,  more  specifically,  banks)  are 
influential  in  terms  of  productivity  growth.  Creditor  involvement  may  be  particularly important for 
poorly performing or financially distressed firms.  
Our main findings are: (i) Whereas we find no relation between leverage and productivity growth in the 
UK, monitoring by creditors (banks) is important in Germany, especially for firms in financial distress, 
(ii) Growth in factor productivity depends on the presence of controlling shareholders (mainly financial 
institutions  like  large  banks  and  insurance  companies)  in  Germany,  (iii)  Control  concentration  is 
                                                 
3 For an early empirical study that examines the relation of ownership concentration, bank influence and profitability, see 
Cable (1985). For more recent evidence, see Edwards and Nibler (2000), Gorton and Schmid (2000), Lehmann and Weigand 
(2000).    Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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strongly related to productivity increases in poorly performing UK firms, but this beneficial impact is 
not present in non-financially distressed firms when (entrenched) insiders hold large control power, (iv) 
Intense  product  market  competition  leads  to  high  productivity  growth  in  UK  firms  with  dispersed 
ownership but has a negative impact on firms with strong voting control, which implies that competition 
and  shareholders  control  may  be  substitutes  in  the  UK,  (v)  In  Germany,  competition  enhances  the 
beneficial impact of controlling financial institutions (banks and insurers) as well as the government on 
productivity growth which suggests that competition and control are more complementary. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I derives the hypotheses. Section II describes the sample, reveals 
the  data sources and shows how the corporate governance and competition variables are measured. 
Section III shows how the productivity function is measured and provides some preliminary evidence on 
the relation of corporate governance and competition to productivity growth. Section IV derives the 
empirical model of productivity growth and details the GMM estimation procedure. Section V discusses 
the results and Section VI concludes. 
I. Hypotheses 
A  number  of  theoretical  studies  argue  that  fierce  product  market  competition  ensures that  efficient 
production  is  a  prime  managerial  aim  (see  Allen  and  Gale  (2000)  for  a  review).  For  example, 
Holmström (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show in a setting with stochastic cost functions that 
perfect  competition  reveals  full  information  about  the  occurrence  of  common  cost  shocks  to 
shareholders.  They  show  that  the  discipline  of  product  markets  stimulates  managers  to  perform 
optimally (in a profit-maximising sense). This is confirmed by Hart (1983) who shows that competition 
reduces  the  amount  of  managerial  slack.
4  Hermalin  (1992)  studies  the  influence  of  product  market 
competition on managerial performance and shows that under certain conditions increased competition 
reduces  agency  costs.  Consequently,  we  hypothesize  that  competition  (measured  by  the  absence  of 
monopoly rents) directs managerial effort towards value creation which can be achieved by (amongst 
others)  productivity  growth.  The  alternative  hypothesis  states  that  increased  competition  may  raise 
demand elasticity and reduce demand for the individual firm. As a consequence increased competition 
may actually lead to reduced managerial effort (Horn et al. (1994) and may increase the probability of 
bankruptcy (Schmidt (1994)). 
Hypothesis 1: Intense product market competition leads to stronger productivity growth. 
                                                 
4 For a more skeptical view, see Scharfstein (1988) who shows that Hart’s results depend on the extent of managers‘ assumed 
risk aversion.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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Large share blocks incentivise their owners to collect corporate information, monitor management and 
influence corporate policy (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). The condition is that such share stakes are 
sufficiently  large  to  internalise  the  costs  of  monitoring  which  are  borne  entirely  by  the  monitoring 
shareholders whereas the potential benefits in terms of performance increases can only be reaped in 
direct  proportion  to  their  equity  stakes.  As  such,  free-riding  behavior  in  firms  with  a  dispersed 
shareholder structure can make monitoring too costly (Grossman and Hart (1980)). Therefore, we expect 
shareholder control to be reflected in stronger productivity growth.  
Hypothesis  2a:  Strong  voting  power  encourages  controlling  shareholders  to  monitor  management. 
Therefore, tight shareholder control is positively related to increases in productivity.  
Different types of shareholders may have distinct incentives or abilities to monitor management. As the 
structure  of  ownership  concentration  varies  substantially  between  German  and  UK  firms,  different 
monitoring intensity may be expected in these countries. Insiders (directors) with substantial voting 
power  may  pursue  their  own  objectives  in  which  private  benefits  may  be  important, next  to  value 
maximisation. Hence, it is possible that productivity growth is slower in insider-dominated firms. In the 
UK,  directors  are  the  second  most  important  group  of  shareholders  in  terms  of  aggregate  share 
ownership. Major outside shareholders benefit most from a share value maximisation strategy and are 
hence  expected  to  encourage  management  to  pursue  this  aim.  In  German  firms,  private  outsiders 
(individuals and families) and non-financial corporations form the prevalent shareholder category and, 
when they own major equity stakes, they always hold supervisory board memberships (Edwards and 
Fischer (1994)).  
Mutual or pension funds and insurance companies are, in aggregate, the largest shareholders in listed 
UK  firms.  Still,  there  are dissenting opinions about institutional shareholder activism. Goergen and 
Renneboog  (2001)  report  that  UK  institutions  are  passive  shareholders  because  (i)  they  lack  the 
resources to be involved in corporate strategy of all their investments, (ii) their individual share stakes 
are frequently not that large and (iii) they abstain from collecting private information in order not to 
immobilize their share stake liquidity due to insider trading regulation. Likewise, Faccio and Lasfer 
(2000) find that occupational pension funds are not involved in monitoring. In contrast, Crespi and 
Renneboog (2000) report that the casting of votes by institutions has risen substantially in the 1990s and 
is now at around 41% for investment funds, 59% of pension funds and 87% of insurance companies. 
The fact that the UK government intends to stimulate monitoring by institutions is reflected by the 
efforts of the 1999 Newbold Committee of Inquiry on institutional vote execution (Stapledon and Bates 
(2002)). In Germany, large banks hold relatively small individual share stakes, but their importance is 
increased through proxy votes, voting rights restrictions and supervisory board seats. Hence, monitoring 
and strategy formulation by such banks (eg. Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Bayerische   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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Hypovereinsbank) and large insurance firms (like Allianz and Munich Re) may be more important than 
in the UK (Franks and Mayer (2001)). 
Hypothesis  2b:  As  monitoring  abilities  differ  across  different types of shareholders, we expect that 
specific types of shareholders are better monitors and can hence ensure stronger productivity growth: 
(i)  Controlling  outsider  shareholders  (individuals  and  families  not  related  to  directors,  financial 
institutions, non-financial firms and the government) have a positive impact on productivity growth.  
(ii) In firms where insiders (directors) can exercise strong voting power, the relation between control 
and productivity growth is insignificant as insiders are insulated from monitoring actions by outside 
shareholders.  
In view of the ownership differences between Germany and UK, we expect the negative insider effect to 
be stronger in the UK and the positive effect of private outsiders, banks and insurance companies, and 
non-financial firms to be stronger in Germany.  
Poor  financial  performance  may  serve  as  a  signal  of  poor  management  quality  which  invites  large 
shareholders to step up corporate monitoring. In cases of financial distress, Franks et al. (2001) show 
that  shareholders  frequently  dismiss  underperforming  management  and  that  they  propose  a  plan  of 
corporate restructuring which may involve strategies or improve factor productivity when refinancing 
the firm. The German government seems more inclined to interfere in ailing companies than in the UK. 
For instance, the government intervened in Holzmann and Deutsche Telecom.   
Hypothesis  2c:  In  financially  distressed  firms,  controlling  blockholders  are  needed  for  corporate 
restructuring and productivity improvements.   
Intense product market competition may make corporate governance actions redundant (null hypothesis) 
or reinforce corporate governance actions by shareholders (alternative hypothesis).  
Hypothesis 2d: Shareholder control and product market competition are complementary disciplinary 
mechanisms such that in industries with strong competition, shareholder control has little bearing on 
productivity growth.  
Banks are effective monitors because they act as delegated monitors (Diamond (1984)), and because 
their incentives to monitor increases with the size of their equity and debt portfolios. In addition, (bank) 
debt  financing  reduces  free  cash  flow  and  therefore  has  a  bonding  or  pre-commitment  effect  on 
management Jensen (1986). Management can use high leverage to signal credibly that they maximize 
profitability and productivity. We expect that creditor monitoring (by banks) is larger in Germany as 
firms contract large amounts of debt with large house banks (Edwards and Fisher (1994)). 
Hypothesis 3a: The bonding effect of high leverage on management stimulates productivity growth. 
Strong bank monitoring leads to increases in factor productivity in Germany.    Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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When a violation of debt contract is imminent, creditor monitoring and involvement in the firm’s 
corporate policy increases.  
Hypothesis 3b: Poor corporate performance or financial distress triggers intense creditor monitoring, 
reflected in higher productivity growth. Considering the credit concentration with large German house 
banks, credit-related productivity growth is larger in Germany than in the UK.  
Hypothesis  3c:  High  leverage  or  bank  debt,  and  product  market  competition  are  complementary 
disciplinary mechanisms such that in industries with strong competition, creditor monitoring adds no 
additional productivity growth. 
II. Sample description, data sources and descriptive statistics 
In this study, we use firm-level data from Germany and the UK. Information on the firms‘ production 
inputs  and  outputs  enable  us  to  estimate  corporate  productivity  growth.  We  also  collect  detailed 
information on ownership structure and concentration, on capital structure, on corporate performance 
and financial distress, and on the competitive environment for each firm. 
 
A. Sample composition and data sources 
The German sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 1074 non-financial firms covering the years 
1986-96.
5 The sample includes firms which are listed on the German exchanges (304 firms; 2797 firm 
years) and firms which are not (770 firms; 3679 firm-years). The listed firms stand for more than 85% 
of  the  stock  market  capitalization.  The  sample  covers  approximately  63%  of  all  large  public 
corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) and is therefore representative for this type of firm. In addition, all 
medium-sized and large private corporations (GmbHs) are included in the sample.
6 We partition the 
firms into three large industry groups: the largest number of firms (841) belongs to the manufacturing 
sector, 57 are in the construction industry, and 176 can be classified as wholesale and retail trade. Data 
from balance sheets and profit and loss-statements are gathered from Hoppenstedt’s Bilanzdatenbank. 
Information on all shareholding of at least 5% and on the control structure is collected from various 
editions of Hypobank‘s Aktienführer as well as Hoppenstedt’s Konzernstrukturdatenbank.  
                                                 
5 The sample excludes all firms from the financial services industries as well as firms that operate in industries still heavily 
regulated during the period of observation (e.g., media, telecommunication, and transport). 
6 We incorporate all the GmbHs included in the Hoppenstedt Bilanzdatenbank. This databank contains information of all 
GmbHs with at least   ¼  PLOOLRQ LQ VDOHV 'HWDLOHG GDWD RQ VPDOOHUGmbHs are not available due to limited disclosure 
requirements. GmbHs cannot be listed on an exchange. 
   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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The UK sample includes 502 firms which constitutes one third of all non-financial listed firms or about 
half of the manufacturing, construction and trade firms, from which the sample is drawn. The sample 
covers the period 1992-99 and captures more than 80% of market capitalization. Like for Germany, the 
largest number of firms (314) belongs to the manufacturing sector. Thirty-five companies are in the 
construction industry and 153 belong to wholesale and retail trade. Balance sheet and Pofit and Loss 
data  are  collected  from  Thomson  Financial  Datastream.  Information  on  control  concentration
7  and 
ownership structure are collected from Worldscope Disclosure archives, which report all large share 
stakes of 5% or more. In order to classify the more than 5000 individual shareholders into insiders 
(directors  and  their  families)  and  outsiders  (shareholders  not  related  to  directors), we consulted the 
London Stock Exchange Monitor and the Who’s Who guides. To identify institutional shareholders, we 
consulted  Datastream  and  Institutional  Investors  Annual  Guides.  Throughout  the  paper,  we  refer to 
executive  and  non-executive  directors  and  their  families  as  ‘insiders’,  and  to  other  individuals  and 
families, financial institutions, industrial and commercial companies and other major shareholders as 
‘outsiders’. The insiders’ shareholdings consist not only of their beneficial holdings but also of the non-
beneficial  ones  held  on  behalf  of  families  and  charitable  trusts.  Directors  do  not  obtain  cash  flow 
benefits  from  these  holdings  but  they  can  exercise  the  control  rights.  Where  stakes  were  held  by 
nominee companies, we identified the effective investors via information provided by the company’s 
finance managers or controllers. Shareholdings of nominees were classified under the category of the 
effective owner. 
 
B. Measuring large shareholder voting power and leverage 
Our first voting power variable captures whether or not a large blockholder can exert a substantial 
amount of control power (CONTROL). For the UK, this is a dummy variable which equals one when the 
large shareholder owns a share stake of at least 10%. Although such a stake is small in a continental 
European context, 10% of control power in the UK is in most cases substantial given the dispersed 
ownership structure of UK firms.
8 For German firms, ownership concentration is significantly higher 
and control is frequently exercised through pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings (Becht and Röell 
(1999)). This implies that concentration measured at the direct level of ownership is inappropriate for 
                                                 
7 Although the UK ownership disclosure threshold (3%) is lower than in Germany (5%), we aligned the thresholds at 5% for 
both countries.   
8 A detailed account of control structures and the distribution of control concentration for most European countries is given in 
Barca and Becht (2001). Increasing the control threshold for UK to 15% or 20% does not substantially change the outcome 
of the paper.     Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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Germany  (Becht  and  Böhmer  (2000),  Köke  (2002a,b)).
9  Therefore,  the  CONTROL-variable  for 
German firms indicates whether or not a firm is controlled by a strong ultimate owner. The concept of 
ultimate ownership (described in appendix 1) encompasses the complexity of control structures and 
strong  control  concentration.  As  alternative  measures  of  total  control  concentration,  we  use  the 
Herfindahl index of overall ownership concentration (HERF) and the size (percentage of total voting 
rights) of the largest share block (BLOCK) by company.  
Table I (panel A) provides some descriptive statistics on control concentration in UK and German firms. 
Whereas the largest block in an average UK listed firm is 20.8% and hence does not even reach the 
blocking minority threshold (of 25%), the largest (ultimate) owner holds a supermajority stake (75.6%) 
in the average German firm. The Herfindahl index which captures not only control concentration but 
also voting rights dispersion, shows an even larger difference between Germany and the UK. Applying 
our  concepts  of  control  (see  above),  we  find  that  approximately  90%  of  German  firms  have  an 
ultimately controlling shareholder, and about 83% of UK firms have a shareholder who owns at least 
10% of all outstanding shares.  
[insert table I about here] 
In addition, we identify all shareholders owning 5% of more of the voting equity for each firm and 
categorize them into 8 owner classes (TYPEi): (i) individuals and families not related to a director; (ii) 
insiders consisting of the CEO, chairman and other executive and non-executive directors and their 
families; institutional investors consisting of (iii) banks, (iv) insurance companies, (v) investment and 
pension funds and (vi) real estate firms; (vii) non-financial companies; (viii) government. The variable 
TYPEi equals one when a firm is controlled by a shareholder of one of the above categories, SHAREi 
equals  one  if  a  specific  shareholder  category  i  is  the  dominating  category  in  terms  of  aggregate 
percentage of voting rights. Panel B of table I shows that the largest fraction of firms is ultimately 
owned by a non-financial firm (41.4%), or by an individual or family (35.6%). Institutional ownership is 
limited in Germany: in 5.4% of the sample firms, a bank holds substantial control and, and in only 2.3% 
other financial institutions are the largest shareholder. Nonetheless, actual voting power of banks may 
exceed the voting power they derive from their own equity stakes if they make use of proxy voting 
(Depotstimmrecht).
10  Recent  evidence,  however,  suggests  that  proxy  voting  is  very  unlikely  to 
significantly enhance bank voting power (Edwards and Nibler (2000)). Government agencies control 
                                                 
9 Renneboog (2000) shows that it is the ultimate shareholders who use their voting power to remove the management of 
poorly performing firms listed on the Brussels stock exchange and that there is little evidence of monitoring by shareholders 
at the directly level (first ownership tier). 
10 At a firm’s annual meeting, a bank can exercise the voting rights related to a firms’ shares that are deposited in the bank by 
the bank’s clients. The bank is allowed to do so provided that it announces in advance its voting intentions to its clients and 
provided that these clients approve.    Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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4.8% of the German sample firms, and a mere 10.4% of firms do not have a controlling shareholders. 
The average free float amounts to 18.4%. For the UK, the distribution of shareholders is strikingly 
different. The UK shareholder class controlling the largest fraction of firms (45.3%) is that of financial 
institutions, of which mutual and pension funds are the dominant category. Comparable to the situation 
in Germany is the position of individuals and families in the UK who control 29.4% of all firms. Most 
of these individuals are insiders (directors). Since the privatisation wave of the end of the 1980s, the UK 
government is no longer involded in corporations as a large shareholder. The fraction of UK firms for 
which no shareholder owns more than 10% of all outstanding shares amounts to 17.0%, but an average 
of 61% of all shares are dissipated over many small shareholders. 
Regarding capital structure, we use different measures for Germany and the UK. Given that Germany is 
often considered as a ‘bank-based economy’, an important measure of debt is the amount of bank debt 
to  total  debt  (BANK).  This  variable  is  expected  to  capture  the  importance  of  banks  (usually  the 
Hausbank)  for  German  firms.  For  the  UK,  we  employ  a  borrowing  ratio (BORROW), measured as 
interest payments over EBITDA (an inverse measure of interest coverage by cash flows), the ratio of 
short-term debt (i.e., with maturity less than one year) to total debt (SHORT) and the debt/equity ratio 
(LEVERAGE). The reason why we do not use the bank debt ratio for the UK is that it is only reported 
for a small minority of UK firms. This is not a serious shortcoming because, in contrast to Germany, 
banks are less prominent and bondholders are relatively more important in the UK. Furthermore, other 
UK-focused studies that apply similar measures (Nickell et al. (1997), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999)) 
which enhances the comparability of results. In our sample, the bank debt ratio amounts to 26.1% for 
the average German company. For the UK, we find an average borrowing ratio of 15.1% and an average 
ratio of short-term debt of 49.9%.  
 
C. Measuring product market competition  
To measure the intensity of product market competition, we determine the firm‘s rents from production 
(RENT), which is interpreted as an ex post measure of market power. The motivation for using this 
measure is that firms operating in less competitive markets should be able to sell their products above 
marginal  cost,  and  therefore  earn  higher  rents  after  covering  their  expenses  (on  capital,  labor,  and 
materials); see Nickell et al. (1997) and Januszewski et al. (2002) for empirical implementations of these 








K p r S
RENT
t t -
=                (1) 
The denominator, Qt, is nominal output (value added), pt
Y Yt - pt
M Mt. The numerator is a measure of 
firm‘s nominal operating surplus, St, less nominal cost of capital, rt
K pt
K Kt. In this notation, Yt is real 




M are the 
corresponding prices. Finally, rt
K is the user cost of capital, defined as rt
K = d + rt, where d is the 
depreciation rate (as in Nickell 1996) and rt is the risk-free market interest rate. The depreciation rate 
can be considered equivalent to the market premium multiplied by beta, which we equate to one as a 
large faction of the German sample are not listed. The raw operating surplus, St, is usually measured by 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA). We use this EBITDA as reported in the UK 
annual  accounts.  However,  German  firms  are  entitled  to  retain  a  fraction  of  earnings  to  build  up 
reserves. Therefore, the German EBITDAs can be a downward-biased measure of raw operating surplus. 
In our sample, this effect is even large enough to make the mean of the rents variable negative in the 
pooled sample. Therefore, in accordance with Lehmann and Weigand (2000) and Januszewski et al. 
(2002), we do not use balance-sheet EBITDA as a measure of raw operating surplus, but employ sales 
less costs for materials and labor, hence St = pt
Y Yt - pt
M Mt - pt
L Lt. In economic terms, this definition is 
equivalent to the definition of EBITDA.  
Table II illustrates the ex post rents, an inverse measure of the intensity of product market competition, 
for 20 two-digit industries. As there may be differences in the level of rents between Germany and the 
UK resulting from the different approaches to calculate EBITDA, we compute relative industry-specific 
ex post rents, i.e., relative to the level of rents for all manufacturing industries in Germany and the UK, 
respectively. For example, a value of 163.0% for the German food industry means that rents in this 
industry are on average 63% higher compared with rents for all sample firms. Table II reveals that there 
are some industries, like textiles, machinery, electrical machinery, medical and optical instruments, that 
are highly competitive (industries with low rents) both in Germany and the UK. In contrast, high rents 
are obtained in both UK and Germany for food production, coal and oil processing, suggesting weak 
competition. There are also industries where competition is high in the UK and low in Germany, and 
vice versa. This implies that the industry-specific intensity of competition is not necessarily the same in 
Germany  and  the  UK,  stemming  from,  for  instance,  different  degrees  of  producer  concentration  or 
different product market regulations. For a vivid account on the compound effect of competition on 
productivity differentials between industries and industrialized nations, see Porter (1992). Hence, our 
empirical analysis (Section V) will allow for the fact that competition may have dissimilar effects on 
productivity growth in both countries. 
[insert table II about here]   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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D.  Measuring financial distress 
The relation between product market competition, corporate governance and changes in productivity 
may  be  entirely  different  for  poorly  performing  firms.  To  measure  whether  a  firm  is  in  financial 
difficulties, we use two indicator variables: (i) LOSS equals one when a firm reports a negative EBITDA 
and is therefore not able to cover its cost of capital, and (ii) STRESS equals one when a firm is not able 
to  cover  its  current  interest  payments  out  of  current  EBITDA.  Applying  the  EBITDA-measure  of 




III. Estimation of a production function  
Prior  to  developing  an  empirical  model  of  the  impact  of  corporate  governance  and  product market 
competition on changes in productivity, we present the estimation results of a classic Cobb-Douglas 
production  function  which  we  use  to  calculate  changes  in  productivity  and  to  investigate  whether 
production  technologies  differ  for  manufacturing,  construction  and  trade.  Subsequently,  a  bivariate 
analysis of the relation between productivity growth and each of our explanatory variables yields some 
interesting insights.   
We  estimate  a  standard  two-factor  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  value  added  as  the 
dependent variable, and labor and capital as independent variables and interpret the residuals from this 
static regression as a measure of relative firm productivity (i.e., relative to the regression mean). This 
concept of relative productivity has a long tradition in applied productivity analysis (see Doms et al. 
(1995) for an application). In a second step, we calculate the first difference of the residuals to obtain a 
measure of productivity growth. As our sample comprises firms from manufacturing as well as from the 
construction  and  trade  industries,  we  interact  the  input  coefficients,  labor  and  capital, with  dummy 
variables capturing whether a firm belongs to the construction sector (Dcon) or the trade sector (Dtrade).  
This  specification  enables  us  to  test  whether  the  input  coefficients  for  the  construction  and  trade 
industries differ from those for manufacturing.  
Table III reports regression results from simple OLS-models, and from random or fixed effects models 
which control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. For Germany, both the OLS and the random effects 
                                                 
11 This discrepancy may emanate from actual differences in financial performance, but also to some extent from using 
different methodologies to calculate EBITDA. In section V, we examine the robustness of all measures employed in the 
regressions, using a range of alternative measures.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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model cannot reject the hypothesis that the input coefficients have a similar impact on construction as 
on manufacturing firms. Firms from the trade sector, in contrast, appear to use a different production 
technology.  Consequently,  in  the  empirical  analysis  of  Section  V,  we  pool  the  firms  from  the 
manufacturing and construction sectors, but examine trade firms separately. The hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale for manufacturing firms is not rejected by the Wald test (table III). The Hausman test 
does  not  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  firm-specific  effects  are  uncorrelated  with  the  explanatory 
variables  for  Germany,  which  implies  that  a  random-effects  model  is  appropriate.  In  contrast,  the 
Hausman test for the UK sample indicates that the random effects model should be rejected in favour of 
a fixed effects model (table III). This fixed effects model discloses that construction firms use a similar 
production technology as manufacturing firms, but that trade firms use a different one. Hence, we also 
will pool UK manufacturing and construction firms, but examine UK trade firms separately. 
[insert tables III and IV about here] 
To get a first impression of the effects of corporate governance and product market competition on 
productivity growth, we split each sample into firms with positive and negative productivity growth.
12 
For  each  of  the  4  subsamples,  we  report  the  means  of  the  corporate  governance  and  competition 
variables in table IV. This bivariate analysis shows that both for Germany and the UK, lower levels of 
rents  (and  hence  more  intense  product  market  competition)  are  associated  with  higher  levels  of 
productivity  growth.  A  larger  fraction  of  firms  that  experience  financial  difficulties,  measured  as 
earnings losses (LOSS) or low interest coverage (STRESS), show a positive change in productivity in the 
year following poor financial performance. This suggests that financial difficulties put more pressure on 
firms  to  increase  productivity.  It  should  be  noted  that,  when  firms  are  poorly  performing  as  a 
consequence of bad management, productivity increases may well be easily achievable. We find little 
evidence that control concentration in the UK is related to productivity growth, but for German firms 
ownership concentration is higher in companies with productivity growth than in those with productivity 
decreases. The positive impact of strong control is most significant when an individual or family, or a 
non-financial firm is the ultimate owner. Capital structure does not appear to play a disciplinary role. 
One  reason  for  considering  changes  in  rather  than  levels  of  productivity  is  that  some  corporate 
governance and competition variables may be endogenous to the level of productivity. As productivity 
growth is less persistent than productivity levels, endogeneity problems may be less severe if lagged 
                                                 
12 Our measure of productivity growth is the first difference of the residuals from the production function estimated using a 
random effects model for Germany and a fixed effects model for the UK.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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values of corporate governance and competition are used (see also the discussion in Nickell (1996)). 
In the econometric analysis of Section V, we use productivity growth as dependent variable and address 
the remaining potential endogeneity by using an instrumental variables approach. 
IV. A productivity growth model and estimation methodology 
In  this  section,  we  derive  an  empirical  model  of  productivity  growth  from  the  firm‘s  production 
function, modelling explicitly the sources of total factor productivity. Specifically, we model the level of  
total factor productivity as a function of the firm‘s past corporate governance record and of its history of 
realising production rents. We therefore assume that productivity is shaped by the compound effect of 
past conditions under which the firm operated, such as intense product market competition or tight 
shareholder/creditor control. As in Nickell et al. (1997), our starting point is a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with two factor inputs,  
(2) 
where Yit is value added, Lit is labor, Kit is capital, and Ait is a measure of total factor productivity for 
firm i in year t. Since we use value added as the output measure, which is defined as total sales less 
materials costs, we implicitly allow for materials as a third input. 
As we are interested in the determinants of total factor productivity growth, we transform the production 
function (2) into a regression equation in several steps. First, we take logs and include lagged output 
using a weight l. This expansion takes into account potential persistence in output. We also include firm 
fixed  effects,  ai,  to  allow  for  unobserved  firm  heterogeneity.  Since  output  can  have  a  stochastic 
component, we add an error term, eit, which is assumed to be serially uncorrelated over time. This yields 
our basic log-linear empirical production function, with small letters denoting logs of Yit, Lit, Kit and Ait: 
    (3) 
Second, taking first differences eliminates the fixed firm effect ai. We obtain the differenced growth 
version of the adjusted Cobb-Douglas production function in (2): 
    (4) 
Finally, we specify the sources of productivity growth by using the level of corporate governance and 
product  market  competition  in  year  t-1.  Corporate  governance  and  competition  are  proxied  by  the 
it it it it A K L Y
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control  structure  (i.e.,  CONTROL,  TYPE,  SHARE),  capital  structure  (i.e.,  BANK,  BORROW),  and 
product market competition (RENT), which enter the model with a one-year lag. To control for cyclical 
effects in productivity growth and to filter out productivity shocks, we add a contemporaneous industry-
specific index that measures capacity utilization (CYCLE) and the time effects m. To control for growth 
effects related to firm size but unrelated to corporate governance and competition, we include lagged 
total assets (ASSET). Thus, productivity growth is modelled as  
      (5) 
Our  empirical  model  of  productivity  growth  is  given  by  (4)  and  (5).  The  structure  of  this  model 
corresponds to the differenced panel model with lagged endogenous variables considered in Arellano 
and Bond (1991). They develop a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that makes use of 
both  the  lags  of  the  dependent  and  explanatory  variables  as  instruments.  In  our  application,  this 
approach addresses the potential endogeneity problems with respect to the corporate governance and 
competition variables that enter the right-hand side of equation (4).
13 As an example of endogeneity 
problems, competition may not be independent of productivity changes because well-performing firms 
may eventually gain a position of market dominance. 
Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  show  that  endogenous  variables  lagged  two  or  more  periods  are  valid 
instruments, provided there is no serial correlation in the time-varying component of the error terms in 
equation (3); we test this condition for all specifications. The instruments we use are yi,t-j for j ³ 2, and 
second lags of RENT and ASSET. We test for instrument validity using a Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions.
14  The  standard  errors  of  our  parameter  estimates  are  robust  with  respect  to 
heteroskedasticity. We also experiment with additional instruments, using all time-varying measures of 
the control structure and capital structure. For Germany, our main results do not qualitatively change. 
For the UK, these specifications cannot be estimated due to problems of multi-collinearity.  
While the Arellano-Bond approach can in principle deal with potential endogeneity problems in our 
application,  there  is  a  caveat.  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  show  that  in  autoregressive  models  with 
                                                 
13 An alternative estimation approach for dynamic panel data models is the standard instrumental variables (IV) estimator 
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). Still, since we model the influence of corporate governance and competition on 
productivity growth using the parameterization in equation (5), the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator is not readily applicable in 
our setting. 
14 Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we use the two-step version of the GMM estimator for obtaining the Sargan test 
statistic, while coefficient estimates are based on the one-step version. Arellano and Bond report that the one-step Sargan test 
is sensitive to heteroskedasticity, tending to over-reject the null. 
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persistent series, the first-difference estimator can be subject to finite sample bias as a result of weak 
instruments. They argue that this bias could be greatly reduced by estimating a model with equations in 
both levels and first differences. We do not apply such a GMM-in-systems estimation procedure here 
for two reasons. First, we assume that the level of corporate governance and competition influences 
productivity growth, which suggests the use of a first-difference estimator. The estimation method has 
the advantage that changes in productivity rather than levels of productivity across firms and industries 
are compared. Second, the potential finite sample bias is unlikely to be an issue as both our samples for 
Germany and the UK are large.  
 
V. Discussion of results 
In Section A, we present the Arellano and Bond GMM-estimation results of the effects of corporate 
governance and product market competition on productivity growth. We examine Germany and the UK 
separately because the theoretical considerations of section 3 suggest that some of the governance and 
competition  measures  are  country-specific.  Therefore  a  pooled  regression  which  assumes  that 
production technologies are identical for Germany and the UK, is not appropriate. In section B, we 
investigate the robustness of our results. 
 
A.  Effects of corporate governance and product market competition 
Our analysis sets out with a basic model that relates the intensity of product market competition (RENT), 
debtholder  influence  (BANK  for  Germany;  BORROW  for  the  UK),  and  large  shareholder  control 
(CONTROL) to productivity growth. Model (1) for Germany in table V shows that a lower level of rents 
and a higher fraction of bank debt to total debt are associated with higher productivity growth. As RENT 
is an inverse measure of product market competition and bank debt (usually granted by one Hausbank) 
is a proxy for creditor influence, these findings suggest that firms experience higher productivity growth 
when  operating  in  more  competitive  markets  and  when  being  under  tight  creditor  control.  These 
findings provide some support for hypotheses 1 and 3a. For the basic UK model (1), none of these 
measures have an impact on productivity growth. 
[insert table V about here] 
As hypothesized in section I, intense product market competition as well as poor firm performance may 
affect  the  effectiveness  of  corporate  governance.  Therefore  we  investigate  the  interaction  between 
competition (RENT), poor corporate performance (LOSS) and corporate governance (large shareholder 
control and creditor influence) in model (2) of table V. For Germany, we conclude that the disciplinary   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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impact  of  a  large  amount  of  bank  debt  on  productivity  growth  is  reinforced  by  poor  financial 
performance, which supports hypothesis 3b. The findings suggest that poor performance of firms that 
are  dependent  on  bank  credit,  triggers  intensified  creditor  monitoring,  which  in  turn  leads  to 
productivity growth in the subsequent period. The interaction of rent and bank debt is also significant 
and positive, indicating that intense product market competition combined with strong bank influence is 
followed by larger productivity increases. When the firm realised large rents from production due to 
weak product market competition, the productivity increases seem no longer to be an important goal 
such that, in this context, bank debt matters less. Thus, it seems that bank debt and product market 
competition  are  complementary  (hypothesis  3c).  Model  (2)  also  analyses shareholder control in the 
context of poor corporate performance and intense competition in Germany. We find that productivity 
growth  increases  with  strong  shareholder  control  (CONTROL),  which  supports  hypothesis  2a. 
Furthermore, the significantly negative sign of the interaction term of rents and shareholder control 
signifies  that  shareholder  control  stimulates  productivity  growth  in  a  context  of  fierce  competition. 
Alternatively, when the firm does not operate in a competitive industry, it seems that large shareholders 
cannot impose the goal of productivity improvement upon management. Thus it seems that product 
market competition and shareholder control are substitutes, which supports the alternative hypothesis 
2d.   
For UK firms, model (2) shows that the presence of a large shareholder control has a negative impact on 
productivity  growth  (which  does  sustain  hypothesis  2a).  Still,  the  interaction  term  with  corporate 
performance (LOSS) shows that when a firm generates losses, the negative impact of shareholder control 
is more than compensated; in fact, strong blockholders are needed to increase productivity, in line with 
hypothesis 2c. We also find that intense competition (low RENT) generates productivity increases and 
that  in  weakly  competitive  industries,  tight  shareholder  control  is  beneficial  (interaction  RENT  and 
CONTROL), which provides some support for hypothesis 2d.  
As we wish to refine our conclusions on shareholder control, we analyse which types of controlling 
shareholders are able to improve productivity growth in table VI.
15 Our results for Germany confirm the 
importance of banks both as creditors and shareholders. In loss making firms, large bank debt (BANK) 
has a beneficial impact on productivity growth. Thus, it seems that corporate losses encourage German 
banks that granted large amounts of debt to confer with the firm’s board about implementing survival 
strategies, part of which focus on productivity increases. Firms realise stronger productivity growth 
when  banks  are  controlling  shareholders  (TYPE=bank),  which  partially sustains hypothesis 2b. The 
                                                 
15 The reference category of shareholder is that of small, dispersed shareholders. For Germany, this category includes all 
firms without an ultimate owner, and for the UK all firms that do not have a shareholder owning 10% or more of outstanding 
shares.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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interaction  term  between  bank  control  and  product  market  competition  (RENT)  is  significantly 
negative, implying that bank control is especially important when competition is strong. Likewise, when 
insurance  companies  are  controlling  ultimate  shareholders,  firm  productivity  rises  in  a  competitive 
environment.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  productivity  growth  also  rises  when  the  government  holds 
controlling share stakes. However, it is in a weakly competitive framework that government control 
leads to lower productivity growth.  
[insert table VI about here] 
For the UK, the results from model (3) support hypothesis 2b as they propound that insider control is 
followed by lower productivity growth (TYPE=insider). Even though these directors own large equity 
stakes,  their  private  benefits  of  control  may  bring  about  deviations  from  the  shareholder  value 
maximisation criterion. As such, entrenched insiders may not manage to bring about an increase in 
productivity, even when competition is staunch (interaction of TYPE=insider with RENT). Furthermore, 
strong voting control may render insiders unaccountable to monitoring from outsider shareholders. This 
is line with Franks et al. (2001) who show that directors with large voting power can successfully 
impede managerial disciplining and are hence entrenched. Still, necessity knows no law: in case of 
earnings losses, the negative impact of insider shareholders on productivity disappears (interaction of 
TYPE=insider with LOSS). Another striking result is that outsider individuals or families, banks, and 
investment  funds  owning  strong  voting  power  seem  to  be  effective  monitors  who  can  help  poorly 
performing  firms  in  generating  increases  in  productivity  (hypotheses  2b  and  2c).
16  The  impact  of 
shareholder control on productivity changes for non-financial distressed firms is limited. Banks with 
substantial voting power (TYPE=bank), which is rare in the UK, is related to productivity decreases, 
especially when competition is strong. Similarly, substantial voting control exercised by real estate firms 
also seems to be related to negative productivity growth, chiefly in the context of low competition. 
Finally, model (3) for the UK also highlights the importance of strong product market competition: it 
leads  to  strong  productivity  growth  in  firms  with  dispersed  ownership.
17  The  degree  of  leverage 
(measured by interest coverage) does not seem to have any impact on productivity, such that hypothesis 
                                                 
16 A Wald test reveals that the sum of the coefficients for TYPE and the interaction with LOSS is significantly positive for 
private outsiders, banks, and funds. 
17 The negative impact of some types of shareholders is not compensated by intense competition in the product markets. 
Taking the sum of the coefficients for RENT, TYPEj, and the interaction of both variables gives the impact of RENT for firms 
under control of shareholder category j. A Wald test shows that this impact is positive for private insider, zero for banks, and 
negative  for  real  estate  companies.  For  all  other  types  of  shareholders,  this  joint  impact  of  RENT  and  TYPE  is  zero. 
Generally, intense competition does not appear to have a beneficial impact on productivity growth for firms under strong 
ownership in the UK.  
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3a is not sustained for the UK. This may result from the fact that creditors of UK firms are relatively 
dispersed (compared to German ones) such that it is more difficult for these banks and bondholders to 
deliberate on corporate strategy with the board of directors.  
All versions of our Arellano and Bond GMM model are generally supported by the standard battery of 
specification tests. The Sargan tests do not reject the hypothesis of instrument validity. Also, the tests 
for second-order serial correlation of the residuals do not reject the null of zero correlation. Wald tests 
cannot reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale. Finally, in all specifications we report, the slope 
coefficients and the sets of time and industry dummy variables are jointly significant according to the 
Wald tests (not reported). 
 
B. Sensitivity of results 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings by introducing alternative specifications of 
some key variables and by experimenting with alternative instruments. In addition, we also estimate the 
model for firms in the trade industry, which use a different production technology than manufacturing 
and construction firms (see section III).  
Alternative definitions for performance, capital structure and shareholder control. 
We investigate whether the results from our benchmark specification, model (3) from table VI remain 
valid when we use an alternative measure for poor performance. We substitute a financial distress-
variable  capturing  the  fact  that  cash  flow  is  insufficient  to  pay  the  interests  (insufficient  interest 
coverage; STRESS) for the earnings losses-variable (LOSS). For Germany, all results remain unaffected: 
see  model  (3.1)  in  table  I  of  appendix  3.  In  particular,  bank  debt  maintains  its  positive  impact  on 
productivity growth for poorly performing firms, and control by financial institutions (i.e., banks and 
insurance  companies)  keeps  their  beneficial  role  which  is  enhanced  by  intense  product  market 
competition. Only the impact of the government as a strong owner is now marginally insignificant 
(10.1%  level).  For  the  UK,  most  results  are  also  similar,  but  the  significance  of  the interaction  of 
shareholder control and poor performance is reduced (in particular, the interaction of STRESS with bank 
control).  What  remains  is  the  beneficial  role  of  institutional  investors  and  outsider  individuals  and 
families in firms in financial difficulties, and the (direct) negative impact of private insiders and real 
estate firms. The findings in table I (appendix 3) do not depend on the definition of the financial distress 
variable: when we harden (or soften) the cut-off point of STRESS, i.e. when the ratio of EBITDA to 
interest payments does not exceed 1.5 (or 0.5), the results do not change. 
When we use the borrowing ratio (BORROW) rather than bank debt (BANK) in the model specification 
for Germany, we find that this alternative measure of creditor influence is not related to productivity   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
 
19
growth (see model (3.2) in table II of appendix 3). Similar non-significant results are obtained for 
LEVERAGE. This is an interesting finding: it shows that not all creditors are important in terms of 
monitoring, but that it is mainly the creditor banks who have an impact on changes in total factor 
productivity. This is hardly surprising: we pointed out that German banks typically play a key role 
among lenders to German companies, and therefore the volume of bank debt should matter more than 
the volume of interest paid to all types of lenders. In addition, the bulk of bank debt of German firms is 
usually contracted from one bank with which the firm has a privileged relation. Model (3.2) also reveals 
that the impact of banks and insurance companies as shareholders remains significantly positive, but the 
direct impact of the government becomes insignificant. The interaction of RENT with bank ownership 
and  government  ownership  remains  significantly  negative,  supporting  the  complementary  role  of 
government  control  and  competition.  As  we  cannot  use  BANK  for  the  UK  (due  to  insufficient 
information),  we  substitute  short-term  debt  to  total  debt  (SHORT)  for  BORROW.  Like  BORROW, 
SHORT does not have any significant impact on productivity growth. All other results from table VI 
remain valid. When we use LEVERAGE (debt over equity) as another alternative measure of capital 
structure, we obtain qualitatively similar results (not shown) to those reported in table II of appendix 3. 
In model (3.3) of table III (appendix 3), we replace the shareholder control variables TYPEi (which 
indicate whether a firm is controlled by an (ultimate) large shareholder of a specific category i) by a 
dummy variable that points out which shareholder category has the largest percentage of aggregate 
voting  rights  (SHARE).
18  For  Germany,  there  is  no  qualitative  change  in  results.  For  the  UK,  the 
interactive effect of LOSS and the respective ownership categories is maintained (and even strengthened 
for non-financial firms) while the negative effects of some controlling shareholders (insiders, banks) has 
become  insignificant.  As  a  further  robustness  test,  we  determine  the  probability  that  the  largest 
shareholder is able to win a vote with a probability of 95% or 99% (WIN) and use this variable instead 
of TYPE.
19 For Germany, the results from model (3) remain qualitatively unaffected (not tabled), but for 
the UK we cannot use this specification as the hypothesis that the second order correlation of residuals 
is zero is rejected. 
All of our results are robust against alternative definitions of the capital stock. We experimented with 
capital stock measures constructed using the method applied by Nickell (1996) and Nickell et al. (1997). 
They  also  apply  a  perpetual  inventory  method,  but  do  not  assume  a  constant  rate  of  depreciation. 
                                                 
18 This new variable assumes that coalitions of shareholders can be forged more easily when shareholders are from one 
specific category of owner. For an indirect test of shareholder coalition in the UK with Shapley values: see Crespi and 
Renneboog (2001).  
19 See Leech and Leahy (1991) for a description of this concept and Nickell et al. (1997) for an empirical application to UK 
firms.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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Varying  annual  depreciation  rates  within  the  range  of  4%  to  12%,  we  can  conclude  that  our 
estimation results are robust.  
 
Alternative instruments 
We also experimented with alternative sets of instrumental variables. For Germany and the UK, all of 
our results are robust to variations of the lag lengths chosen for the instruments. They are also robust to 
using additional instruments, particularly the second lags of all time-varying measures of ownership 
structure and capital structure, but only for Germany. For the UK, some of these specifications cannot 
be estimated due to problems of multicollinearity. 
 
We  identified  the  following  results  from  model  (3)  of  table  VI  that  remain  valid  throughout  all 
robustness tests: (i) monitoring by creditors influences productivity growth positively in Germany but 
not in the UK, and only for firms in financial difficulties, (ii) monitoring by shareholders is beneficial 
when the owner is a bank or an insurance company in Germany, (iii) monitoring by shareholders leads 
to productivity decreases in non-financially distressed UK firms when these shareholders are insiders, 
banks or real estate firms, (iii) strong shareholder control (by insiders, private outsiders and institutions) 
leads  to  productivity  growth  in  financially  distressed  UK  firms,  and  (iv)  intense  product  market 
competition along with institutional control enhances productivity growth in Germany. 
 
Different industry focus: the trade sector 
All results discussed above are based on a sample of German and UK manufacturing and construction 
firms, which were shown to have similar production technologies (section III). In order to investigate 
whether our findings are also valid for the trade industries (i.e., retail and wholesale trade), we re-
estimate model (3) using a sample of trade firms: see table IV in appendix 3. Bank debt influences 
productivity growth positively in a highly competitive environments in Germany but, in contrast to our 
earlier  findings,  does  not  stimulate  productivity  increases  in  poorly  performing  firms.  Such  firms 
experience  productivity  increases  when  the  government  or  large  insurance  firms  are  controlling 
blockholders. For the UK, the results for trade firms are also very different from the results obtained for 
manufacturing  and  construction  firms.  Strong  creditor  influence  (measured  as  BORROW)  in 
combination  with  intense  competition  has  now a beneficial impact on productivity growth, and the 
impact of strong blockholders owners turns positive for outsider individuals or families, and real estate 
firms. An interesting similarity between the results for trade and manufacturing firms in the UK is that 
banks as well as funds exert a monitoring role for poorly performing firms.   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
 
21
Overall, most of our findings for manufacturing and construction firms do not seem to apply to trade 
firms. We note, however, that both in Germany and in the UK financial institutions appear to have a 
monitoring function for trade firms as well. 
VI. Conclusions 
This  study  investigates  the  impact  of  corporate  governance  (large  shareholder  control  and  creditor 
influence) and product market competition on the growth of total factor productivity. We use two large 
data panels of consisting of 1074 German firms over the period 1986-96 and 502 UK firms over the 
period 1992-99. We address potential endogeneity problems by applying a general method of moments 
estimation technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
We  find  strong  evidence  that  corporate  governance  regimes  and  product  market  competition  affect 
productivity growth. The results differ significantly between Germany and the UK. For Germany, we 
find that bank debt plays a particularly important role for financially distressed firms. The significant 
positive relation between a firm’s bank debt obligations and subsequent productivity growth suggests 
that banks perform a monitoring role of poorly performing firms to preserve the value of their loans. 
Furthermore, German firms controlled by financial institutions (in particular, large banks and insurance 
companies)  show  higher  productivity  growth.  This  points  towards  active  governance  by  banks  and 
insurers. It should be noted that representatives of these institutions occupy a seat on the supervisory 
board and hence are well positioned to influence corporate strategy. These results stand at odds with a 
skeptical view on the German model of corporate governance that states that corporate governance in 
Germany  is  too  bank-oriented  and  therefore  too  inflexible  compared  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  market-
oriented  system  (Hellwig  (2000)).  Our  results  suggest  that  lending  relationships  and  institutional 
ownership in Germany cannot simply be dismissed as too inflexible and outdated, as often argued. Our 
results are therefore consistent with Cable (1985), who documents a disciplinary role of German banks 
for the 1970’s, and with Elsas and Krahnen (1998), who confirm (based on credit-file data) that German 
house banks provide liquidity insurance in times of financial difficulties. Our results are also consistent 
with Gorton and Schmid (2000) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) who find a positive impact of bank 
ownership  on  earnings-based  performance  measures.  In  contrast,  our  findings  are  inconsistent  with 
Edwards  and  Nibler  (2000)  who  report  that  German  banks  are  different  from other large corporate 
shareholders, and Januszewski et al. (2002), who document a negative impact of financial institutions on 
productivity growth but ignore in their model the role of capital structure and financial performance. 
 
For  the  UK,  we  do  not  find  evidence  that  creditors  or  bondholders  have  a  beneficial  impact  on 
productivity growth. This result is not consistent with the findings of Nickell et al. (1997) and Nickell 
and Nicolitsas (1999). Our findings are in line with Franks et al. (2001) who show that even when firms   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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are  poorly  performing  and  a  violation  of  debt  covenants  is  imminent,  there  is  little  evidence  of 
intensified  creditor  monitoring.  They  report  that  it  is  rather  the  large  outsider  shareholders  who 
restructure poorly performing firms. Our study exhibits strong evidence that the presence of controlling 
insiders  (directors  and  their  families)  leads  to  low  productivity  growth  in  non-poorly  performing 
companies. It seems that such entrenched insiders have other objectives than generating increases in 
productivity. Controlling banks and real estate firms also influence productivity growth negatively, even 
in the wake of fierce competition. In contrast, large shareholder control (by insiders, outsider individuals 
or  families,  and  financial  institutions)  does  have  a  strong  beneficial  impact  on  productivity 
improvements  in  poorly  performing  firms.  The  fact  that  controlling  institutions  (banks,  insurance 
companies)  bring  about  productivity  increases  is  somewhat  surprising  as  past  corporate  governance 
research  on  the  UK  has  produced  evidence  of a passive monitoring stance by institutions (Lai and 
Sudarsanam (1998), Faccio and Lasfer (2000)). However, the beneficial impact on firm performance of 
the more sophisticated institutional investors compares favorably to evidence from the US (Carleton et 
al. (1998), del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).  
 
Intense product market competition strengthens the beneficial impact of controlling financial institutions 
(banks  and  insurers)  as  well  as  the  government  on  productivity  growth  in  Germany.  These  results 
suggest that competition in product markets either has a disciplinary effect in itself or that the pressure 
of competition makes large shareholders’ interference with corporate strategy more effective. Thus, it 
seems that product market competition and shareholder control are more complementary in Germany. A 
number of recent empirical studies confirm such a disciplinary role of product market competition; see 
Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001) for Italy, Januszewski et al. (2002) for Germany, and Caves (1992) and 
Porter (1992) for evidence from several major Western economies. For the UK, we find some (weak) 
evidence  that  an  environment  of  strong  competition  generates  productivity  growth  in  firms  with 
dispersed ownership. Nickell et al. (1997) report a stronger positive impact of competition for the UK. 
In addition, tight competition reinforces the negative relation between insider and institutional control 
on productivity growth. These two findings suggest that product market competition and shareholder 
control are to some extent substitutes.  
A key result of this paper is that the firm’s environment (more specifically, the intensity of competition 
in  product  markets  and  financial  health  of  a  firm)  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  effectiveness  of 
corporate  governance  mechanisms.  These  relationships  between  governance  characteristics  and 
variables  describing  the  firm’s  environment  remained  unobserved  as  long  as  our  empirical  model 
specification did not allow for more complex interactions of explanatory variables. A lesson which we 
can draw is, therefore, that it is important to investigate the complexity of corporate governance regimes 
in more detail, not at least as some issues discussed extensively in economic theory (such as the role of   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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competition and corporate control) do not yield unambiguous predictions. As to further research, it 
would be interesting to expand this analysis to other industries (like the service sector in which different 
production  technologies  are  used).  Also,  as  bank  creditors  are  particularly  important  in  German 
corporate governance, more detailed research on the composition of bank debt structure as well as bank 
representation on corporate boards and shareholder activism by banks would be worthwhile. Likewise, 
this study would benefit from the analysis of detailed data of the credit structure of UK firms. In both 
German and UK, financially distressed and poorly performing firms experience productivity growth 
provided shareholder control is large. An interesting extension to this paper would be an analysis of how 
productivity  growth  is  obtained  (e.g.  via  corporate  asset  sales,  financial  restructuring,  board 
restructuring, changes in voting control).  
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Appendix 1. Concept of ultimate ownership (for Germany) 
The identification of the ultimate owner for each firm is based upon German corporate law and involves 
two  steps.  First,  we  identify  the  ultimate  owner  for  every  direct  shareholder  of  a  firm  using  the 
following three rules: 
·  Rule 1 (strong ownership rule): A chain of control is pursued to the next level if the shareholder 
being  analyzed  is  owned  to  50%  or  more  by  a  shareholder  on  the  next  level,  while  all  other 
shareholders on the next level own less than 50%. 
·  Rule 2 (weak ownership rule): If rule 1 does not apply, a chain of control is pursued to the next level 
if the shareholder being analyzed is owned to 25% or more by a shareholder on the next level, while 
all other shareholders on the next level own less than 25%. 
·  Rule 3 (stop rule): If neither rule 1 nor rule 2 applies, a chain of control is not pursued any further. 
These rules guarantee that no more than one ultimate owner is identified for every direct shareholder. 
Note that if a shareholder has split his ownership stake in a particular company into several smaller 
stakes, for example into two blocks of 50% held by two subsidiary firms, we combine these smaller 
stakes into one single block.  
We set the first cut-off point at 50% because German law allows an investor owning 50% of all shares 
to appoint management.
20 The second cut-off point is set at 25% because an investor owning 25% of the 
shares has the right to veto board decisions.  
After having identified all ultimate owners (for every direct shareholder), we single out the shareholder 
that is in ultimate control of the company. When no shareholder fulfils the above rules, the respective 
firm is considered as being widely held. 
 
                                                 
20 A 50% majority is sufficient to dismiss management after its regular period of office, and a majority of 75% to dismiss 
management during its period of office (§103 (1) AktG).   Corporate governance, competition and productivity growth   
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Appendix 2. Definition of variables 
All variables for Germany and the UK are appropriately deflated and are measured in prices of the same 
year. Sources of price and cost indexes and other aggregate variables are given below, along with details 
on how we construct each variable. 
Value added 
The firm’s value added, Yt, is defined as output (total sales) less total materials costs. Real values are 
obtained using a two-digit industry-specific producer price index. For Germany, this index is published 
by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2, 1998). For the UK, 
this index is published by National Statistics.
21 
Capital stock 
The  firm’s  capital  stock,  Kt,  is  defined  as  replacement  costs  of  tangible  assets  including  machines, 
buildings, and land. For Germany, Kt is deflated using a combined input price index for capital goods 
and land, weighted by their empirical distribution (Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 17, Reihe 2, and 
Fachserie 17, Reihe 4, 1998). For the UK, Kt is deflated using a price index for plant and machinery for 
two-digit industries (National Statistics). Both for Germany and the UK, replacement costs of capital are 
calculated using the method of Bond et al. (1999). They adjust the historical cost values for inflation and 
then  apply  a  perpetual  inventory  method  with  a  constant  annual  depreciation  rate  of  d  =  0.08. 
Specifically,  
 
where Kt is the capital stock, pt
K is the price index for capital goods, It is real investment and d the 
depreciation rate. The starting value is the net book value of tangible assets, adjusted for inflation in 
previous years. 
Labor 
The firm’s labor input, Lt, is defined as the total number of employees. 
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Business cycle proxy 
To control for business cycle effects, we use a survey-based index of capacity utilization at the two-digit 
industry level as a proxy variable (CYCLE). For Germany, this index is part of the ifo Geschäftsklima 
and was obtained from the ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich. For the UK, this index was 
obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. 
Corporate governance: control concentration 
CONTROL (dummy) indicates whether or not a firm is controlled by a large shareholder: an ultimate 
large owner for German firms and a shareholder owning at least 10% for UK firms. The concept of 
ultimate ownership (described in appendix 1), encompasses the complexity control structures and strong 
control concentration. HERF stands for the Herfindahl index of overall ownership concentration and 
BLOCK is the percentage of equity controlled by the largest shareholder. 
Control concentration by type of owner 
In addition, we identify all shareholders for each firm and categorize them into 8 owner classes (TYPE): 
(i) individuals and families not related to a director; (ii) insiders consisting of the CEO, chairman and 
other executive and non-executive directors and their families; institutional investors consisting of (iii) 
banks, (iv) insurance companies, (v) investment and pension funds and (vi) real estate firms (for UK 
only); (vii) non-financial companies; (viii) government. For Germany, we cannot distinguish between 
private insiders and private outsiders. If a German firm has no ultimate owner according to the concept 
of  control  (see  appendix  1),  the  ownership  stake  is  labelled  ‘dispersed‘.  For  the  UK, ownership  is 
‘dispersed‘ if a firm has no shareholder owning more than 10% of outstanding shares.  
Corporate governance: capital structure 
Capital  structure  is  measured  using  three  alternative  measures  of  creditor/bondholder  influence  on 
management. BANK is the ratio of bank debt to total debt (for Germany only), BORROW is the ratio of 
interest payments to earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITDA), SHORT is the ratio of 
short-term debt (i.e., with maturity less than one year) to total debt (for the UK only). 
Product market competition 
Production rents (RENT) are defined as operating surplus minus the cost of capital, divided by value 
added. Value added, Qt, is nominal output, pt
Y Yt - pt
M Mt. The numerator is the nominal operating 
surplus St, less nominal cost of capital, rt
K pt
K Kt. Yt is real output, Lt, Kt, and Mt are real labor, capital, 




M are the corresponding prices. Finally, rt
K is the user cost of 
capital, rt
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Table I. Ownership concentration and structure by shareholder type  
Panel  A  shows  mean  ownership  concentration  for  German  and  UK  sample  firms  (median  in  parentheses).  BLOCK 
represents the % of control held by the largest shareholder. HERF stands for the Herfindahl index of overall ownership 
concentration. The CONTROL-variable for German firms indicates whether or not a firm is controlled by an ultimate 
owner (see appendix 1), and indicates whether a large shareholder controlling 10% of more of the voting rights is present 
for the UK firms. Panel B shows the % of firms in which a shareholder of a specific owner category holds the largest share 
stake and the cumulative % of large shareholdings (of 5% or more) by shareholder category. 
 
Panel A: Ownership concentration 
     
  Germany  UK 
     
% Equity held by largest owner (BLOCK)  75.6% (90.0%)  20.8% (15.6%) 
Herfindahl of all owners (HERF)  66.9% (81.0%)  8.3% (4.6%) 
Strong owner (CONTROL)  89.6% (100%)  83.0% (100.0%) 
Number of observations.  6476  2280 
     
 
Panel B: Ownership concentration by type of shareholder 
     
  Germany  UK 
Type of shareholder  % of firms controlled 
by type of ultimate 
owner 
Cumulative % of 
voting rights by type 
of owner 
% of firms 
controlled by type 
of owner 
Cumulative % of 
voting rights by type 
of owner 
Individuals and families  35.6%  30.0%  29.4%  14.4% 
   thereof: Insiders  25.0%  19.8%  26.9%  12.1% 
Financial institutions  7.8%  8.1%  45.3%  20.8% 
              Bank  5.4%  5.6%  3.7%  1.6% 
              Insurance co’s  2.3%  2.5%  2.0%  2.6% 
              Investment fund  0.0%  0.1%  39.2%  16.5% 
              Real estate  0.0%  0.0%  0.5%  0.1% 
Non-financial firm  41.4%  38.9%  8.3%  3.7% 
Government  4.8%  4.6%  0.0%  0.0% 
Dispersed  10.4%  18.4%  17.0%  61.1% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 




Table II: Relative ex post production rents by industry. 
This table shows the level of rents (RENT), an inverse measure of product market competition, by two-digit industry. 
Production rents are defined as operating surplus minus the nominal cost of capital, divided by nominal output (value 
added). Rents are reported as relative rents, i.e., relative to rents of all manufacturing firms contained in the sample. 
The test statistics are heteroskedastic t-tests of equal means. *, **, *** stand for significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively.  
  Industry-specific rents  
relative to rents of all manufacturing firms 
  Germany  UK 
Food  163.0% 
***  150.4% 
*** 
Tobacco  171.3% 
***  n.a. 
 
Textiles  60.9% 
***  79.7% 
** 
Clothing  194.7% 
***  43.8% 
** 
Wood  104.8% 
  91.4% 
 
Paper  135.8% 
***  65.8% 
*** 
Furniture  106.2% 
**  136.0% 
*** 
Publishing and printing  109.0% 
***  131.5% 
*** 
Chemicals  139.1% 
***  56.3% 
*** 
Coal and oil processing  145.0% 
***  186.7% 
** 
Rubber and plastic   98.2% 
  134.9% 
*** 
Leather  164.5% 
***  87.9% 
 
Rock, stone, glass  104.6% 
*  82.4% 
 
Metals  42.8% 
***  129.3% 
*** 
Metal products  97.3% 
  98.1% 
 
Machinery  75.0% 
***  89.3% 
* 
Electrical machinery  77.9% 
***  61.8% 
*** 
Vehicles  57.3% 
***  124.3% 
*** 
Medical,  optical,  and  control 
instruments 
71.2% 
***  82.0% 
 
Miscellaneous  n.a.    102.3%  
All manufacturing firms  100.0%    100.0%  




Table III: The production function for manufacturing, construction and trade. 
This table presents the regression results from OLS, and random effects and fixed effects models relating the factor 
inputs  of  a  standard  Cobb-Douglas  function  (capital  and  labor)  to  output  growth.  The  p-values  (reported  in 
parentheses) are based on robust standard errors, which are calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for 
the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For 
definitions of the input variables, see appendix 2. 
 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent 
variables 
Germany  UK 
  OLS  Random effects  OLS  Random effects  Fixed effects 
















































































Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of obs.  6476  6476  2282  2282  2282 
Adj. R
2  0.575  0.576  0.899  0.900  0.582 
Random effects 
(Hausman test) 
--  p=0.492  --  p=0.037  -- 
Constant returns to 
scale (Wald test) 
p=0.099  p=0.435  p=0.673  p=0.300  p=0.122 
 




Table IV: The relation of corporate governance and product market competition on 
positive versus negative changes in productivity. 
This table presents a bivariate analysis of the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on 
changes in productivity. Changes in productivity growth are approximated by the first differences of the residuals 
from  the  estimation  of  a  two-factor  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  including  time  and  two-digit  industry 
dummies (table III). This function is estimated using a random effects model for Germany and a fixed effects model 
for the UK. The sample includes limited to manufacturing and construction firms, which have a similar production 
technology in terms of table III. BLOCK represents the % of control held by the largest shareholder. HERF stands for 
the Herfindahl index of overall ownership concentration. CONTROL for German firms indicates whether or not a 
firm is controlled by an ultimate owner (see appendix 1), and indicates whether a large shareholder controlling 10% 
of more of the voting rights is present for the UK firms. TYPEi is a dummy variable expressing whether or not a 
shareholder of a type i is the controlling shareholder. BANK is the ratio of bank debt to total debt (for Germany only), 
BORROW  is  the  ratio  of  interest  payments  to  earnings  before  interest,  taxes,  and  depreciation  (also  known  as 
EBITDA), SHORT is the ratio of short-term debt (i.e., with maturity less than 1 year) to total debt (for the UK only). 
RENT is an inverse measure of product market competition. Production rents are defined as operating surplus minus 
the nominal cost of capital, divided by nominal output (value added). Rents are reported as relative rents, i.e., relative 
to rents of all manufacturing firms contained in the sample. LOSS and STRESS are dummy variables which equal 1 
if, respectively, the firm generates a negative EBITDA and the firm is not able to cover its interest payments out of 
current EBITDA. All variables are lagged by a one year with regard to changes in productivity. The test statistics are 
heteroskedastic  t-tests  of  equal  means.  *,  **,  ***  stand  for  significance  at  the  0.10,  0.05,  and  0.01  levels, 
respectively.  
  Germany  UK 
Productivity growth  negative  significance 
of difference 
in means 




Control concentration             
Strong control (CONTROLt-1)  88.9%    89.2%  82.9%    86.8% 
% equity held by largest owner (BLOCKt-1)  72.5% 
**  74.5%  20.6%    21.0% 
Herfindahl of all owners (HERFt-1)  62.4% 
**  65.2%  8.1%    8.2% 
Strong control by owner type (TYPEi,t-1)    
         
TYPEi,t-1 , i = individual or family   41.7% 
***  36.6%  29.6%    32.2% 
TYPEi,t-1 , i = financial institution  8.0% 
  7.8%  46.7%    46.5% 
TYPEi,t-1 , i = non-financial firm  36.8% 
**  40.4%  6.6%    8.1% 
Leveraget-1   
         
Bank debt as % of total debt (BANKt-1)  29.2% 
  28.4%  n.a.    n.a. 
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)  7.4% 
  7.7%  9.9%    7.5% 
Short-term debt as % of total (SHORTt-1)  n.a. 
  n.a.  48.8%    45.9% 
Production rents (1/Competition) (RENTt-1)  27.5% 
***  27.2%  16.1% 
*  15.3% 
Financial performance/distress   
     
   
Negative EBITDA (LOSSt-1)  2.0% 
***  6.3%  6.6% 
***  14.0% 
Interest cover <1 (STRESSt-1)  2.1% 
***  6.8%  8.2% 
***  14.9% 
Number of obs.  2155    2596  654    559 




Table V: The impact of corporate control and product market competition on productivity growth 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating corporate governance and product market competition to productivity growth. The sample 
includes manufacturing and construction firms. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-
values (reported in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For variable definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (1GERM.)  Model (2GERM.)  Model (1UK)  Model (2UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.116 (0.345)  -0.144 (0.200)      0.317
** (0.050)  0.286
* (0.055)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.297 (0.271)  0.247 (0.330)      0.145 (0.122)  0.112 (0.181)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.778
*** (0.000)  0.788
*** 0.000)      0.662
*** (0.000)  0.741
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  -0.638
** (0.031)  -0.232 (0.510)      -0.039 (0.593)  -0.252
* (0.091)     
Bank debt (BANKt-1)  0.238
** (0.012)  -0.415 (0.131)  1.563
* (0.052)  5.221
** (0.030)         
Interest/EBITDA (BORROWt-1)          -0.043 (0.239)  0.011 (0.837)  0.060 (0.831)  0.031 (0.710) 
Strong control (CONTROLt-1)  0.002 (0.928)  0.171
* (0.084)  -0.471
* (0.083)  -0.193 (0.720)  -0.003 (0.900)  -0.079
** (0.039)  0.369
** (0.030)  0.198
*** (0.006) 
Business cycle (CYCLEt)  0.010 (0.598)  0.011(0.562)      -0.005 (0.134)  -0.006 (0.104)     
Ln of total assets (ASSETt-1)  0.010 (0.485)  0.006 (0.696)      -0.005 (0.222)  -0.002 (0.510)     
Time effects  Yes  Yes      Yes  Yes     
Number of obs.  3853  3853      832  832     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.4171  p=0.2629      p=0.3868  p=0.5779     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.6753  p=0.7173      p=0.1160  p=0.1094     
Const. returns to scale  p=0.5651  p=0.5917      p=0.1086  p=0.1118     




Table VI: Impact of large shareholder control and product market competition on productivity growth. 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating shareholder control and product market competition to productivity growth for German and 
UK manufacturing and construction firms. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT. The p-values 
(reported  in  parentheses)  are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (3GERMANY)  Model (3UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.160 (0.136)      0.300
** (0.042)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.273 (0.264)      0.087 (0.262)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.768
*** (0.000)      0.745
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  0.194 (0.505)      -0.262
* (0.085)     
Bank debt (BANKt-1)  -0.129 (0.703)  0.569 (0.582)  4.443
** (0.039)       
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)        0.038 (0.486)  -0.170 (0.577)  0.055 (0.554) 
Controlling shareholder by type i:              
TYPEi,t-1 i=  private individual or family  0.040 (0.693)  -0.121 (0.666)  0.598 (0.479)       
TYPEi,t-1 i= insider (director and family)        -0.158
*** (0.004)  0.686
*** (0.005)  0.259
** (0.017) 
TYPEi,t-1 i= outsider individual or family        -0.040 (0.291)  0.258 (0.134)  0.319
** (0.011) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  bank  0.607
*** (0.004)  -2.388
*** (0.006)  -1.214 (0.313)  -0.063
* (0.079)  0.400
** (0.023)  0.402
** (0.042) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  insurance company  0.373
*** (0.008)  -1.089
** (0.022)  0.220 (0.369)  -0.143 (0.174)  0.442 (0.285)  0.172 (0.137) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  investment/pension fund  2.019 (0.354)  -5.391 (0.455)  n.a.  -0.041 (0.308)  0.232 (0.191)  0.151
** (0.044) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  real estate        -1.459
*** (0.000)  -4.55
*** (0.000)  n.a. 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  non-financial firm  0.159 (0.155)  -0.380 (0.234)  -0.119 (0.870)  -0.042 (0.435)  0.136 (0.579)  0.175 (0.116) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  government  0.440
* (0.066)  -1.621
** (0.017)  0.193 (0.911)       
Business cycle (CYCLEt)  0.011 (0.534)      -0.006 (0.107)     
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1)  0.001 (0.918)      -0.004 (0.249)     
Time effects  Yes      Yes     
Number of obs.  3853      832     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.2707      p=0.6778     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.8434      p=0.2273     





Appendix 3      Table I: Control, competition and productivity growth. Robustness test (with financial distress) 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating shareholder control and product market competition to productivity growth for German and 
UK manufacturing and construction firms. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-values 
(reported  in  parentheses)  are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (3.1GERMANY)  Model (3.1UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.148 (0.209)      0.300 (0.044)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.240 (0.291)      0.104 (0.201)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.797
*** (0.000)      0.739
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  0.164 (0.573)      -0.229 (0.125)     
Bank debt (BANKt-1)  -0.053 (0.868)  0.248 (0.797)  3.703
** (0.046)       
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)        0.0298 (0.625)  -0.029 (0.910)  -0.0522 (0.468) 
Controlling shareholder by type i:              
TYPEi,t-1 i=  private individual or family  0.020 (0.846)  -0.074 (0.804)  0.934 (0.341)       
TYPEi,t-1 i= insider (director and family)        -0.136
** (0.011)  0.587
** (0.016)  0.167 (0.104) 
TYPEi,t-1 i= outsider individual or family        -0.0208 (0.595)  0.166 (0.325)  0.193
* (0.068) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  bank  0.635
*** (0.003)  -2.474
*** (0.005)  -1.105 (0.355)  -0.043 (0.219)  0.331
* (0.063)  0.154 (0.243) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  insurance company  0.359
*** (0.008)  -1.008
** (0.028)  0.244 (0.281)  -0.137 (0.175)  0.411 (0.310)  0.155 (0.164) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  investment/pension fund  1.598 (0.352)  -3.881 (0.485)  n.a.  -0.032 (0.398)  0.1878 (0.267)  0.128
** (0.024) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  real estate        -1.453
*** (0.000)  -4.710
*** (0.000)  n.a. 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  non-financial firm  0.176 (0.103)  -0.449 (0.145)  -0.094 (0.889)  -0.029 (0.565)  0.068 (0.764)  0.104 (0.228) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  government  0.364 (0.101)  -1.431
** (0.028)  0.693 (0.680)       
Business cycle (CYCLEt)  0.011 (0.564)      -0.006 (0.111)     
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1)  0.001 (0.925)      -0.005 (0.158)     
Time effects  Yes      Yes     
Number of obs.  3834      832     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.2600      p=0.5279     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.6331      p=0.1886     
Const. Returns to scale  p=0.5629      p=0.0941     




Appendix 3    Table II: Control, competition and productivity growth. Robustness test (with different of capital structure) 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating shareholder control and product market competition to productivity growth for German and 
UK manufacturing and construction firms. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-values 
(reported  in  parentheses)  are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (3.2GERMANY)  Model (3.2UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.163 (0.137)      0.271 (0.102)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.342 (0.186)      0.074 (0.372)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.740
*** (0.000)      0.759
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  0.158 (0.530)      -0.021 (0.871)     
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)  0.613 (0.204)  -2.496 (0.345)  0.490 (0.639)       
Short-term debt (SHORTt-1)        0.028 (0.503)  -0.159 (0.446)  -0.029 (0.710) 
Controlling shareholder by type i:              
TYPEi,t-1 i=  private individual or family  -0.070 (0.552)  0.149 (0.657)  1.925
** (0.045)       
TYPEi,t-1 i= insider (director and family)        -0.119
** (0.022)  0.485
** (0.029)  0.286
** (0.036) 
TYPEi,t-1 i= outsider individual or family        -0.011 (0.775)  0.132 (0.414)  0.282
** (0.029) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  bank  0.539
** (0.013)  -2.290
*** (0.010)  -0.310 (0.830)  -0.038 (0.360)  0.269 (0.152)  0.298
** (0.025) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  insurance company  0.251
* (0.092)  -0.792 (0.126)  0.466 (0.311)  -0.092 (0.307)  0.190 (0.587)  0.147 (0.205) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  investment/pension fund  1.847 (0.375)  -4.816 (0.489)  n.a.  -0.003 (0.944)  0.035 (0.795)  0.145
* (0.078) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  real estate        -1.421
*** (0.000)  -4.783
*** (0.000)  n.a. 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  non-financial firm  0.120 (0.259)  -0.355 (0.263)  0.499 (0.532)  -0.008 (0.887)  -0.076 (0.763)  0.132 (0.193) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  government  0.298 (0.188)  -1.250
** (0.046)  1.875 (0.261)       
Business cycle (CYCLEt)  0.010 (0.600)      -0.005 (0.123)     
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1)  0.003 (0.841)      -0.004 (0.382)     
Time effects  Yes      Yes     
Number of obs.  3853      764     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.5244      p=0.4851     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.9180      p=0.2640     




Appendix 3    Table III: Control, competition and productivity growth. Robustness test (with different control structure) 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating shareholder control and product market competition to productivity growth for German and 
UK manufacturing and construction firms. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-values 
(reported  in  parentheses)  are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (3.3GERMANY)  Model (3.3UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.158 (0.141)      0.264
* (0.053)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.293 (0.2359      0.067 (0.361)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.773
*** (0.000)      0.763
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  0.709 (0.313)      0.105 (0.769)     
Bank debt (BANKt-1)  -0.146 (0.669)  0.642 (0.536)  4.566
** (0.034)       
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)        0.031 (0.587)  -0.167 (0.606)  0.125 (0.166) 
Aggregate % of voting rights of shareholder category i:            
SHAREi,t-1 i=  private individual/family  0.271 (0.299)  -0.675 (0.286)  0.505 (0.542)       
SHAREi,t-1 i= insider (director)        -0.087 (0.364)  0.297 (0.459)  0.346
*** (0.001) 
SHAREi,t-1 i= outsider individual/family        0.036 (0.699)  -0.301 (0.485)  0.239
** (0.034) 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  bank  0.700
** (0.022)  -2.482
*** (0.007)  -1.122 (0.349)  0.035 (0.693)  -0.065 (0.862)  0.824
*** (0.000) 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  insurance company  0.522
* (0.066)  -1.275
* (0.077)  0.155 (0.474)  -0.009 (0.925)  -0.068 (0.851)  0.173 (0.220) 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  investment/pension fund  0.062 (0.887)  1.852 (0.304)  n.a.  0.021 (0.808)  -0.110 (0.751)  0.143
** (0.016) 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  real estate        -0.095 (0.477)  0.266 (0.641)  n.a. 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  non-financial firm  0.385 (0.169)  -0.905 (0.185)  -0.180 (0.797)  -0.017 (0.865)  0.081 (0.857)  0.381
** (0.026) 
SHAREi,t-1 i =  government  0.667
* (0.069)  -2.132
** (0.034)  0.161 (0.926)       
Business cycle (CYCLEt)  0.011 (0.542)      -0.005 (0.140)     
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1)  0.003 (0.849)      -0.003 (0.372)     
Time effects  Yes      Yes     
Number of obs.  3853      832     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.2863      p=0.5407     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.7862      p=0.1183     
Const. returns to scale  p=0.4888      p=0.0734     




Appendix 3 Table IV: Impact of shareholder control and product market competition on productivity growth for the trade industry 
This table presents the results of a GMM-regression (Arellano and Bond, 1991) relating shareholder control and product market competition to productivity growth for German and 
UK firms in the trade industry. All regressions include time and two-digit industry dummies. Instruments are yit-j and the second lags of ASSET and RENT.  The p-values (reported 
in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors calculated using the White/Huber sandwich estimator for the variance-covariance matrix. *, **, *** stand for significance at the 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. For definitions, see table IV and appendix 2. 
  Dependent variable: output growth (' yit) 
Independent variables  Model (3GERMANY)  Model (3UK) 








Lagged output growth (Dyt-1)  -0.069
* (0.070)      0.149
*** (0.003)     
Capital growth (Dkt-1)  0.224 (0.194)      0.218
*** (0.001)     
Labor growth (Dlt-1)  0.520
*** (0.002)      0.536
*** (0.000)     
Rent (RENTt-1)  0.915 (0.305)      0.145 (0.447)     
Bank debt (BANKt-1)  -1.102 (0.111)  2.798
* (0.087)  1.243 (0.755)       
Interest on EBITDA (BORROWt-1)        0.049 (0.382)  -0.440
* (0.095)  0.061 (0.283) 
Controlling shareholder by type i:              
TYPEi,t-1 i=  private individual or family  0.553 (0.260)  -1.143 (0.273)  0.889 (0.247)       
TYPEi,t-1 i= insider (director and family)        0.058 (0.173)  -0.224 (0.310)  0.030 (0.453) 
TYPEi,t-1 i= outsider individual or family        0.104
** (0.039)  -0.471
** (0.024)  0.034 (0.698) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  bank  0.541 (0.245)  -1.197 (0.247)  n.a.  0.050 (0.317)  -0.387 (0.153)  0.206
*** (0.009) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  insurance company  0.174 (0.715)  0.158 (0.881)  15.808
*** (0.000)  0.048 (0.438)  -0.293 (0.237)  n.a. 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  investment/pension fund  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.011 (0.822)  -0.147 (0.585)  0.109
* (0.096) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  real estate        0.360
** (0.031)  -1.569
* (0.057)  n.a. 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  non-financial firm  0.847
* (0.089)  -1.788
* (0.092)  -2.995 (0.435)  -0.002 (0.964)  -0.011 (0.971)  0.343
* (0.064) 
TYPEi,t-1 i =  government  -0.369 (0.694)  0.596 (0.755)  0.532
*** (0.002)       
Ln (total assets) (ASSETt-1)  0.0254
** (0.029)      -0.001 (0.848)     
Time effects  Yes      Yes     
Number of obs.  475      395     
Instrument validity (Sargan test)  p=0.4167      p=0.7104     
Second-order corr. of resid.  p=0.8075      p=0.5271     
Const. returns to scale  p=0.3371      p=0.0000     
 